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4Mark-to-Market Accounting for United States
Corporate Pensions: Implementation
and Impact
Joseph Busillo, Thomas Harvey, and Bryan Hoffman
Deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pensions have been an ongoing management challenge
for United States corporate plan sponsors. Among the many issues is how to
properly account for the associated assets and liabilities, providing clarity
regarding the plan itself while not diluting transparency into the underlying
business performance of the corporate plan sponsors. Traditional generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for pensions is a somewhat Byzantine
mechanism attempting to balance these two often conﬂicting goals. There is an
alternative approach that a small segment of plan sponsors has recently imple-
mented for their pension plans: mark-to-market (MTM) accounting. Shedding
to various degrees the smoothing mechanisms provided under GAAP, this
method exposes not only the balance sheet but also the income statement to
the volatility of annual pension performance (cf. Maurer et al. 2016).
Most plan sponsors have been extremely reluctant to pursue this
approach. Concerns over shareholder and market reactions have limited
adoption of MTM to a handful of plan sponsors. Our expectation was that
the accounting methodology should have a negligible effect on a plan
sponsor’s share value. In this chapter, we explore a number of aspects of
MTM to better understand the following:
(1) the relative appeal of GAAP and MTM accounting standards to plan
sponsors, and why a plan sponsor would or would not adopt MTM;
(2) the impact of MTM accounting on investors and plan sponsor share
price;
(3) the reaction of MTM adoption on equity analysts, ratings agencies,
and management teams; and
(4) the impact of MTM adoption on investment strategy.
Moreover, we provide alternatives to the most common pension sponsor
investment strategies and an evaluation of their efﬁciency under MTM.
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Overview of MTM Pension Accounting
The implementation of Accounting Standards Codiﬁcation 715 (ASC 715)
in 2006 moved pension economics out of the footnotes and directly onto
the ﬁnancial statements of corporate America. The goal was to incorpor-
ate the net assets and liabilities of DB plans onto corporate balance
sheets so that a company’s investors could gain a more transparent view
of the ﬁnancial impact associated with its pension plan. However, under
the current GAAP, plan sponsors can use a variety of techniques to smooth
out that impact.
GAAP rules allow for delayed recognition on the income statement of
gains or losses on pension plans’ assets and liabilities. Plan sponsors can also
use an expected return ﬁgure that reﬂects their long-term expected returns
on their current portfolios. Annual variances between expected and actual
market returns are accrued in ‘accumulated other comprehensive income’
(AOCI) on the balance sheet. Likewise, deviations from expected liability
growth are accrued in AOCI. The AOCI amounts are then amortized over
time on the income statement, usually over the expected future working
lifetime of plan participants. Plan sponsors are, in effect, shielded from a
signiﬁcant portion of the actual volatility of their DB pension assets and
liabilities.
Appeal of GAAP
GAAP provides a signiﬁcant cushion to a plan sponsor’s income statement,
generally accomplishing the goals as intended: to minimize ﬁnancial state-
ment volatility from noncore operations (i.e., the DB pension). GAAP
effectively permits the plan sponsor to decrease the year-to-year volatility
of pension expenses on corporate ﬁnancial statements. This smoothing
of real asset returns and delayed recognition spreads immediate gains
and losses into the future, bleeding them in over time. Companies are
thus shielded from reporting the immediate impact of signiﬁcant adverse
market events.
In addition, as the predominant methodology for accounting for DB
plans, the use of GAAP supports comparability between corporations and
across time periods. Despite its many inherent weaknesses, GAAP—as it is
almost universally applied—enjoys the obvious beneﬁt of widespread
acceptance.
The current accounting framework also allows plan sponsors to favor equi-
ties over ﬁxed-income assets in DB plan investment allocations. Increased
equity allocations raise the expected returns used to determine pension
expense, while any losses experienced through such an implementation are
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amortized over time. Plan sponsor earnings are thus shielded from the volatil-
ity inherent in an aggressive portfolio allocation, while the higher expected
returns increase earnings in the near term.
Note that this feature may not always be beneﬁcial. That is, the ultimate
investors are not shielded to the extent that there is a settlement event that
requires a short-term recognition of the pro-rata portion of the loss that may
be outstanding.
Weaknesses of GAAP
In an effort to account for the impact of pension economics without
overwhelming the underlying operating company’s ﬁnancial perform-
ance, GAAP conventions smooth out the actual DB pension results and
amortize these results over a period of time. This approach may work if
the actual performance is at variance with the predicted performance
within a modest band, and these variances generally offset each other year
to year. Unfortunately, a large adverse market event—such as the one
experienced in 2008—has a relatively large and long-term effect. For most
DB plan sponsors, the ﬁnancial crisis created a large pool of unamortized
losses to be recognized over time. While enjoying the signiﬁcant
shield GAAP provided at the time, most plan sponsors ﬁnd themselves
facing an extended period of amortizing large losses, creating an ongoing
earnings drag.
For many with closed or frozen DB plans, these additional ‘costs’ are
related to legacy beneﬁts that bear little relationship to the organization’s
current operations and cost structure. Plan sponsors are struggling with how
to account for these legacy beneﬁts and minimize pension plan expense
volatility, while providing clarity to investors regarding the ﬁnancial per-
formance of their base operations.
The United States MTM Alternative
The typical GAAP mechanisms that a DB pension plan uses in its ﬁnancial
statements result in a smoothing of asset values. This smoothing is such that
the expected return on assets is more stable, as well as accruing gains or
losses into the AOCI account that are amortized into the income statement
over time. The expense can be booked on a prospective basis and any gain
or loss will accrue in the AOCI at the end of the year to be amortized in
future years.
Alternatively, a sponsor is able to elect to account for its plan without
these smoothing mechanisms. This method is known as mark-to-market
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(MTM) accounting, or a fair value accounting approach. In full MTM
accounting, the sponsor can only book its DB plan expense retrospectively.
This means that actual gains or losses from assets and liabilities for the
current year will be booked as current year expenses. To accomplish this,
the sponsor uses the fair market value of assets. The expected return on
assets will be replaced with actual return on plan assets and the amortization
period for any gains or losses is in essence changed to one year. An example
of this is shown in Table 4.1.
Why MTM is Attractive to Plan Sponsors
The major beneﬁt of implementing MTM accounting for a pension plan
is that the company can restate historical ﬁnancial statements to reﬂect
actual plan losses experienced. The company can also remove ‘escrowed’
losses—losses incurred in the past but still awaiting future amortization—
from its income statement. Through adoption of MTM, the plan sponsor
can effectively eliminate the drag on earnings from future pension loss
amortizations.
Furthermore, some plan sponsors feel that the move to an accounting
policy without smoothing is more transparent and consistent with the dir-
ection in which accounting rules are headed. Since there is no fundamental
change in the underlying cash ﬂows or health of the company, the draw may
be a cleaner, more transparent policy.
Finally, given the low interest rates experienced over the past ﬁve years,
plan sponsors have implemented MTM under the belief a rate rise is
inevitable. Rising interest rates would reduce the pension liability, likely
creating an MTM gain. Rising liability discount rates would potentially
become a tailwind to expense reductions, increasing future earnings.
TABLE 4.1. Annual pension cost ($)
GAAP MTM Diff
Service Cost (Beneﬁts Accrued) 10.2 10.2 0.0
Interest Cost 77.0 77.0 0.0
Expected Return on Assets (95.6) (95.6) 0.0
Amortization of Actuarial Losses 20.0 0.0 (20.0)
MTM (Gain)/Loss NA (12.3) (12.3)
= Total Pension Cost 11.6 (20.7) (32.3)
Notes: GAAP refers to Generally Accepted Accounting Principle; MTM
refers to Mark-to-Market; Diff refers to the difference between GAAP
and MTM costs.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2016, SPi
54 Retirement System Risk Management
Why Plan Sponsors have been Reluctant to Adopt
The risk in a transition to MTM accounting arises from the fact that the
company’s pension expense is likely to be more volatile going forward. Shift-
ing toMTM accounting also carries the potential threat of a negative earnings
impact, as happened when the 2012 decline in interest rates overwhelmed the
rise in pension asset values and eroded funding levels in most plans.
Many US DB plan sponsors have been reluctant to give up the income-
level smoothing mechanisms of traditional GAAP and adopt MTM. In
dialogue with management teams, multiple issues drive this reticence, includ-
ing concerns over the impact of earnings and earnings per share (EPS)
volatility on investor, equity analyst, and ratings agency reactions. Manage-
ment teams are also often incentivized by GAAP earnings and sensitive regard-
ing the impact that MTM accounting could have on annual earnings.
In an effort to evaluate these concerns in the context of shifting to MTM,
we analyze each in turn. Our expectation was that, as a noncash item, the
accounting for DB pensions should have a negligible impact on a ﬁrm’s
share price, analyst review, or credit rating.
Investors
The ﬁrst questions we considered were whether investors view the shift to
MTM negatively, and whether companies pay a price in terms of share value
for making the move. For each of the 23 companies in our analysis, SEI
conducted an event study to evaluate movements in share price over a ﬁve-
day period surrounding the announcement of the accounting change. In
addition, the analysis included each company’s Q4/2012 earnings release in
order to provide insight into the MTM impact for the full calendar year. We
then constructed a capital asset pricing model line for each company, based
on actual performance relative to that of the appropriate subset of the S&P
1500, and we used regression analysis to predict an expected change in
company return given a change in benchmark return.
Results indicated that the companies studied experienced no statistically
signiﬁcant changes in share price that would reﬂect a direct, obvious share-
holder response to the implementation of MTM accounting. Moreover, the
analysis showed no change in share price as a result of the ‘noise’ inherent
in using actual asset and liability returns on ﬁnancial statements, rather than
including those results in the footnotes. Although a few early adopters such
as Verizon experienced abnormally large but transitory changes in share
price following the initial announcement, those changes did not translate
into sustained effects on share value, either positively or negatively. This
research conﬁrms what we expected: with no cash implications, changes in
accounting measures have no direct impact on share prices.
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Analyst community
Next, we looked at whether analysts appreciate the change in accounting for
pension expenses and whether they recognize the impact on earnings
volatility for comparison purposes. For some time, analysts have frequently
employed MTM analysis in evaluating ‘core’ earnings and the cash impact of
DB pension plans. For large companies in which the plan is large relative to
market capitalization, analysts unwind GAAP treatment of losses and focus
on the projected cash impact of the plan going forward. Likewise, in com-
paring anMTM company’s EPS with traditional GAAP comparables, analysts
generally unwind the MTM adjustment, using the company’s smoothed
GAAP earnings across time periods to compare performance.
A careful review of the Q4/2012 earnings calls of the 23 companies in our
study revealed little to no discussion of the impact of MTM accounting
versus GAAP for the organizations’ pensions, nor did company representa-
tives spend time discussing the resulting volatility in their earnings. Analysts
appeared to be unsurprised by the earnings drag that MTM companies felt
in 2012 due to the decline in interest rates. Across all 23 calls, there were
very few questions and no direct criticisms of the new accounting imple-
mentation. It is worth noting that, in many analyst reports, pension liabilities
were still calculated using GAAP, meaning the MTM impact was adjusted
out of the analysts’ annual earnings forecasts for those companies. For an
example of our analysis see Table 4.2.
Ratings agencies
We also looked at whether a plan sponsor’s credit rating tended to be
affected by a move to MTM accounting. Reviews of the rating practices of
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch, as well as discussions with Moody’s
Investor Services, indicate that a shift to MTM by a plan sponsor does
not cause a signiﬁcant disruption to the ﬁnancial analysis practices of the
major ratings agencies. Among several other non-GAAP adjustments that
the ratings agencies make to corporate ﬁnancial statements, applying full
MTM treatment for pensions appears to be standard practice.
At the same time, pensions and pension volatility have a discrete but
limited effect on overall ratings. Compared with a company’s revenue and
debt, pension-related factors generally have a modest impact on its credit
rating. Signiﬁcant changes to a plan’s funded status may limit credit rating
upgrades, but such changes are unlikely to lead directly to a downgrade if
they are not accompanied by other changes in the company’s creditworthi-
ness. Since the major ratings agencies already are, in effect, using MTM in
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TABLE 4.2. Pension descriptors
In millions (USD$) Pension Asset Allocation Pension Metrics
Company Ticker MTM
Announcement
Date
Assets Liabilities Funded
Ratio
(%)
Equity
(%)
FI
(%)
Other
(%)
Pension
Assets/
Market
Cap (%)
Pension
Assets/
Adj Corp
Assets
(%)
Pension
Assets/
Book
Value
(%)
Unfunded
PBO/
EBITDA
Albermarle ALB 2012 563.3 762.4 74 57.8 27.6 14.6 9.6 16.4 29.1 0.3x
Ashland ASH 2011 3,320.0 4,877.0 68 51.0 47.0 2.0 48.4 21.5 81.0 2.0x
AT&T T 2011 45,060.0 58,910.0 76 55.0 34.0 11.0 23.0 25.0 49.0 0.4x
Babcock &Wilcox BWC 2012 2,127.7 2,780.0 77 6.0 51.0 43.0 62.1 43.6 219.7 1.9x
ConAgra CAG 2012 3,343.3 3,817.5 88 49.0 23.0 28.0 22.0 14.1 63.5 0.2x
Eastman Chemical EMN 2012 2,298.0 3,133.0 73 52.0 26.0 22.0 20.0 16.6 76.0 0.6x
FirstEnergy FE 2011 6,671.0 8,975.0 74 16.0 57.0 27.0 41.9 11.7 51.3 0.8x
Graftech GTI 2011 163.1 231.8 70 11.8 88.2 0.0 16.1 6.6 12.1 0.3x
Honeywell HON 2010 18,872.0 22,389.0 84 49.3 37.1 13.6 29.9 31.1 137.0 0.7x
IBM IBM 2010 91,688.0 106,129.0 86 39.8 52.0 8.3 40.0 43.0 482.0 0.5x
HIS IHS 2011 161.0 180.7 89 28.3 67.4 4.2 2.2 4.3 10.0 0.1x
Johnson Controls JCI 2012 4,642.0 5,761.0 81 49.2 40.2 10.6 18.0 13.0 39.0 0.4x
Kellogg K 2012 4,374.0 5,238.0 84 66.2 24.4 9.4 18.0 22.3 157.0 0.4x
LS Starrett SCX 2011 107.4 145.5 74 27.0 12.0 61.0 153.6 31.3 86.3 4.5x
PerkinElmer PKI 2012 336.3 580.5 58 55.0 39.0 6.0 8.8 8.1 18.3 0.8x
PolyOne POL 2011 410.4 597.2 69 70.6 21.3 8.1 16.0 16.0 65.0 0.8x
Rexnord RXN 2011 577.7 720.6 80 30.0 67.0 3.0 31.3 15.0 130.8 0.4x
Reynolds American RAI 2011 5,422.0 6,293.0 86 29.0 59.0 12.0 20.0 25.0 100.0 0.3x
SAIC SAI 2011 86.0 94.0 91 43.0 57.0 0.0 1.6 1.4 3.3 0.0x
Teradyne TER 2012 302.9 376.5 80 13.0 85.8 1.2 9.6 10.8 16.2 0.2x
United Parcel Post UPS 2012 25,742.0 32,957.0 78 44.4 33.4 22.2 31.0 40.0 637.0 2.3x
Verizon VZ 2011 18,282.0 26,773.0 68 43.7 35.4 20.9 12.0 7.5 21.4 0.6x
Windstream WN 2012 999.0 1,400.1 71 44.2 51.4 4.4 20.2 6.8 90.0 0.2x
Median MTM Cos 76.5 44.2 33.4 22.2 20.0 16.0 65.0 0.4x
US Public Medians 74 53.0 37.1 9.9 10.9 9.5 20.9 0.2x
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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their analyses, a shift to MTM accounting should have a negligible impact on
a particular plan sponsor’s credit rating.
Internal management
Finally, we evaluated how management incentives were affected by the
change in EPS that results from the increased volatility in pension gains
and losses. It is not unusual for some portion of a management team’s
incentive compensation to be tied to annual GAAP earnings performance.
Since pension expenses average approximately 10 percent of a corporate
EPS, the additional volatility associated with an MTM implementation has
the potential to have a material impact on earnings. In response, based on
available proxy statements, all companies adopting MTM accounting have
appeared to revise their compensation plans to exclude the MTM adjust-
ment, effectively shielding management bonuses from the volatility of actual
pension performance.
Interestingly, many of the companies that SEI surveyed did not de-risk
their pension plans to reduce volatility prior to implementing MTM
accounting. Instead, they chose to maintain more aggressive investment
portfolios. The net effect of combining the higher expected return in
accounting for pension expense, eliminating the amortization associated
with historical losses, and adjusting out the MTM impact, is that manage-
ment ultimately gets the beneﬁts of a more favorable EPS without the
penalty of past poor performance. In many respects, this is an ideal outcome
for management.
Pension Allocation Not Generally Changed by
Accounting Method
Looking at the companies that have adopted MTM, we did ﬁnd it surprising
that those companies did not generally change their DB plan asset alloca-
tion in response to the switch. Most sponsors stick to a traditional mix of 60/
40 equities/ﬁxed-income strategies, similar to the investment strategy fol-
lowed by a large majority of corporate pension plans using traditional GAAP
pension accounting. Rather than address the impact of pension plan vola-
tility through a better asset/liability match, most plans simply use non-GAAP
adjustments to address those results, rather than reduce the actual eco-
nomic volatility.
We continue to believe that many corporate plan sponsors’ reticence to
adopt MTM is based on the concerns outlined, and that annual volatility will
have an undesirable impact on earnings. This concern over earnings
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volatility is a reasonable one. We ran a simple Monte Carlo simulation using
SEI’s proprietary capital market assumptions to show the inherent risks to
GAAP EPS of maintaining a traditional asset allocation when adopting an
MTM accounting policy. We use a three-factor, short-rate model to deter-
mine the near-term interest rate. The three factors are inﬂation, real rates,
and an option-adjusted spread. These factors are projected using an auto-
regressive (AR) model [AR(1) process] with drift. After the short rate is
determined, we can determine the long rate on the yield curve using
standard methods in stochastic calculus. The return is then determined
on the long bond associated with that rate and all other asset classes are
correlated to this return. The ultimate output is 1,000 simulations over 10
years for all asset classes and full-yield curves. Figure 4.1 shows the increased
volatility that can be expected when an MTM policy is adopted (note that
this does not show the one-time effect of switching from smoothed account-
ing to MTM). Clearly, switching to an MTM accounting method without
some shift in asset allocation could cause undesired volatility and stress.
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Figure 4.1 Volatility comparison 60/40
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Perhaps more critically, the economic exposures associated with this
strategy can be signiﬁcant. A poorly matched asset–liability investment
strategy poses several challenges to the plan sponsor, including increasing
the value at risk through limiting the natural liability hedge associated with
investments in long-duration ﬁxed income; increasing potential required
contributions in adverse scenarios, including poor capital markets and
declining discount rates; and creating signiﬁcant uncertainty around pro-
jected contribution levels.
Despite these challenges, most plan sponsors continue to pursue a heavily
equity-oriented strategy within their DB pensions, in an effort to beneﬁt
from the higher expected long-term returns on equities to reduce the ‘costs’
associated with the pension liability. Given the increased transparency asso-
ciated with MTM accounting and the immediate impact of pension portfolio
returns on corporate earnings under the MTM framework, sponsors switch-
ing to MTM might also consider a change in investment strategy.
Two alternatives to the typical equity-centric allocation paradigm are of
interest. The ﬁrst, liability-driven investment (LDI), focuses on closely
matching liability exposures and seeks to minimize funded status volatility.
The second, risk parity, pursues a more balanced approach to risk without
sacriﬁcing expected return, giving management the opportunity to reduce
funded status volatility without reducing expected incentive-based compen-
sation, which typically remains based on expected return on pension assets
even after the switch to MTM accounting.
Method 1: liability-driven investment
Given the nature and timing of promised beneﬁt payments, a full liability
matching strategy with high-quality ﬁxed-income assets is a natural default
position for a DB plan. Since the purpose of the plan is to provide employees
with income during retirement (a form of deferred wages), it is not clear
why the associated expense should be treated differently than any other
corporate liability. A full LDI method (at 100 percent funded) will allow
the plan to maintain the current funded ratio with the smallest possible
tracking error.
Method 2: risk parity
The second approach can be thought of as a more diversiﬁed substitute for
the traditional 60/40 portfolio. In this context, rather than generating
optical diversiﬁcation by focusing on capital allocations, risk parity seeks
genuine diversiﬁcation by balancing risk allocations across asset classes.
Details of this strategy will now be discussed.
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A primer on risk parity
Risk parity investing emphasizes risk exposure diversiﬁcation, not simply
dollar allocations. This distinction can be illustrated quite powerfully by
considering the traditional 60/40 equity/ﬁxed-income DB plan portfolio.
While this portfolio initially appears quite balanced, with nearly equal dollar
(capital) allocations to both stocks and bonds, a risk decomposition paints
an entirely different picture. Because equities are so much more volatile
than intermediate-term ﬁxed income, the 60/40 dollar split derives over 90
percent of its risk from equities. Thus, when volatility is taken into consid-
eration, the apparent diversiﬁcation of the 60/40 portfolio disappears.1 Risk
parity investing seeks to restore balance to the portfolio by allocating equal
amounts of risk to each asset class, seeking genuine diversiﬁcation by risk
instead of optical diversiﬁcation by capital.
In order to achieve such balanced risk allocations, risk parity portfolios
must invest higher dollar amounts into less volatile asset classes and vice
versa. Naturally, the initial act of reducing the size of equity investments and
allocating more to ﬁxed income would be expected to reduce the expected
return (and risk) of the resulting portfolio. Depending on the risk tolerance
and return requirements of the investor, this outcome might not be desir-
able. In such instances, a risk parity portfolio typically employs a modest
amount of leverage (generally obtained via derivative contracts) to restore
the portfolio’s expected return and volatility to the desired levels. Hence
risk parity portfolios need not be ‘conservative,’ low-risk investments; they
can be geared to target the same level of expected volatility as the 60/40
portfolio, the equity market as a whole, or any other level deemed appro-
priate. The crucial distinction is that, by achieving this level of volatility in a
more diversiﬁed fashion, risk parity offers the potential for higher returns
for any given level of volatility when compared to more concentrated
alternatives such as the 60/40 portfolio.
The beneﬁts of risk parity in an asset-only context have been addressed at
length in the ﬁnancial literature. Interestingly, these advantages become
even more powerful in a liability-relative setting. As mentioned earlier, LDI
constitutes an intuitive and sensible default option for pension asset port-
folios as it allows for the lowest volatility of funded status. Nevertheless, it
cannot be ignored that many sponsors are reluctant to adopt a full LDI
strategy for a variety of reasons. While risk parity is no substitute for true
LDI, it could potentially offer a signiﬁcantly more efﬁcient alternative to
equity-heavy allocations, such as the 60/40 portfolio, in an asset–liability
framework.
Put simply, risk parity offers a more efﬁcient asset portfolio in a DB plan
setting because the assets it holds bear at least some resemblance to a typical
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DB plan’s liability stream. Most liability structures closely resemble a ‘short’
position in long-duration ﬁxed income; this is the default position of a DB
plan prior to the formation of any asset portfolio. Plans that invest their
assets in equity-heavy portfolios, such as the 60/40 portfolio, thereby do little
to hedge their liabilities. Given the 60/40 portfolio’s more than 90 percent
concentration in equity risk, the performance of such an asset portfolio has
little to do with the change in the value of the plan’s liabilities. This
mismatch creates extreme volatility in terms of the true economic exposures
underlying the plan’s surplus or deﬁcit.
By contract, a risk parity approach allocates a meaningful amount of its
risk budget to nominal, investment-grade ﬁxed income. Consequently, it
can reasonably be expected to correlate more closely with a plan’s liabilities,
potentially reducing the ‘tracking error’ of the asset portfolio relative to the
liability stream, thereby reducing the volatility of a plan’s surplus or deﬁcit.
Again, because the risk parity portfolio can be geared to target any desired
level of risk or return, this reduction in surplus risk need not come with a
decline in expected return. Rather, sponsors who are willing to accept a
certain level of risk (such as those currently following a 60/40 allocation)
can still accept that amount of risk, but with potentially higher returns and
improved surplus efﬁciency, by allocating to a risk parity portfolio.
Risk parity’s potentially improved efﬁciency can be demonstrated both
historically and prospectively. First, it is useful to conduct a historical analysis
comparing the performance of the 60/40 portfolio and a naive risk parity
portfolio relative to the Citigroup Intermediate Pension Liability Index
(CPLI), with emphasis on both return and risk relative to the liability
proxy. The analysis here is based on the 20-year period, 1995–2014, with
the sample limited by data availability for the CPLI. In this example, the 60/
40 portfolio is constructed using the S&P 500 for equity exposure and the
Barclays US Aggregate for ﬁxed income. The static weights for the naive risk
parity portfolio are calculated by balancing risk contributions from the S&P
500, Barclays US Aggregate, and Bloomberg Commodity Index over the full
20-year period. Once these weights are determined, the portfolio is levered
to match the full sample volatility of the 60/40 portfolio so that each
portfolio exhibits the same level of risk over the sample period.
Figure 4.2 highlights the intuitive argument that a risk parity asset portfolio
should offer less tracking error than a 60/40 asset portfolio with the same level
of volatility. This exhibit plots the rolling three-year annualized tracking error
of each asset portfolio relative to the CPLI over the sample period. Clearly,
both asset allocation paradigms produce large amounts of liability-relative risk,
and risk parity is far from a perfect hedge to the CPLI. Nevertheless, it seems
clear that risk parity should offer ‘less’ tracking error relative to liabilities. The
60/40 portfolio consistently experiences larger deviations from the liability
benchmark compared to the risk parity portfolio.
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Even risk-averse plan sponsors need to know whether risk parity’s reduction
in surplus volatility comes at the cost of lower returns. Given its improved
diversiﬁcation proﬁle and the ability to target any desired level of portfolio
volatility, there are compelling ex ante reasons to expect that risk parity
should be able to outperform its more concentrated counterparts, on aver-
age. If the asset portfolio can be constructed so that it is fully compensated
for every unit of risk that it assumes (regardless of how much total risk that
involves), the expected return on that portfolio ought to be higher than that
on a more concentrated, and less efﬁcient, portfolio. The 20-year sample
period results in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 support this intuition and demonstrate
that, over this historical sample, a volatility-matched risk parity portfolio
outperformed a 60/40 implementation in both absolute and risk-adjusted
terms. Given the higher historical return and the lower tracking error
relative to liabilities, risk parity offered a considerable improvement in
terms of surplus efﬁciency over this period.
It is both natural and valid to question the time-period-speciﬁc nature of
these outcomes. Without question, the secular decline in bond yields has
0
5
10
15
20
25
12
/1
/1
99
7
7/
1/
19
98
2/
1/
19
99
9/
1/
19
99
4/
1/
20
00
11
/1
/2
00
0
6/
1/
20
01
1/
1/
20
02
8/
1/
20
02
3/
1/
20
03
10
/1
/2
00
3
5/
1/
20
04
12
/1
/2
00
4
7/
1/
20
05
2/
1/
20
06
9/
1/
20
06
4/
1/
20
07
11
/1
/2
00
7
6/
1/
20
08
1/
1/
20
09
8/
1/
20
09
3/
1/
20
10
10
/1
/2
01
0
5/
1/
20
11
12
/1
/2
01
1
7/
1/
20
12
2/
1/
20
13
9/
1/
20
13
4/
1/
20
14
11
/1
/2
01
4
60/40 Tracking Error versus Liability Index
Risk Parity Tracking Error versus Liability Index
Figure 4.2 Rolling three-year tracking errors versus Citigroup Pension Liability
Index (CPLI)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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provided a tailwind for any strategy that allocated meaningfully to ﬁxed
income over the past 20 years compared to more equity-centric alternatives.
With interest rates considerably lower now than at the beginning of
the sample period, forward-looking expectations for risk parity’s outper-
formance versus the 60/40 portfolio should be more modest. While the
volatility-reducing properties of risk parity in the DB context remain equally
compelling on a forward-looking basis, it is clear that this sample period is a
relatively favorable one for the performance of risk parity compared to less
balanced alternatives.
Fortunately, forward-looking prospects for risk parity returns remain quite
strong, both absolute and relative to the 60/40. Central to this expectation is
the more diversiﬁed nature of risk parity compared to its more popular and
concentrated counterpart. Because the 60/40 derives over 90 percent of its
risk from stocks, it is inherently betting that stocks will offer far higher risk-
adjusted returns than bonds over the investment horizon. In fact, for such
extreme risk concentration to be defensible from a mean-variance optimiza-
tion perspective, stocks would have to offer over three times the Sharpe Ratio
(risk-adjusted return) of bonds.With less extreme assumptions for the relative
performance of stocks and bonds, the diversiﬁcation offered by a risk parity
allocation is rewarded with higher expected risk-adjusted returns compared
to more concentrated alternatives, such as the 60/40. The introduction of
liabilities and the tracking error-reducing potential of risk parity make this
tradeoff even more compelling than in an asset-only context.
This advantage can be illustrated on a forward-looking basis using SEI’s
proprietary equilibrium capital market assumptions for expected returns,
risks, and correlations among asset classes. Using our assumptions for the
60/40 portfolio, under each asset allocation paradigm, the risk parity port-
folio, an LDI portfolio, and a generic liability stream, expected DB pension
expenses are simulated for the next decade. The choice of asset portfolio
construction mechanism produces the expected effects on both the level
and volatility of pension expense. While risk parity dominates the traditional
60/40 paradigm in terms of surplus efﬁciency, neither methodology can
match the liability-hedging properties of full LDI.
The fundamental tradeoffs of these strategies appear in Figure 4.5. The
traditional 60/40 approach has far more volatility than the LDI or risk parity
strategy. The LDI strategy has minimal expense over the projection period
with the lowest amount of volatility. While the 60/40 and risk parity port-
folios might be expected to produce positive net income on average, this
expectation comes at the expense of signiﬁcantly higher volatility. Given
that the purpose of a DB pension plan is not to generate accounting income,
LDI seems to be a much more sensible ‘starting point’ for plan sponsors,
who can then deviate from a full hedging policy in a thoughtful and
measured fashion if they view the risk/return tradeoff as favorable.
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Conclusion
Despite problems with traditional GAAP for US corporate pensions, plan
sponsors have been reluctant to adopt full MTM accounting. Concerns over
the resulting additional earnings volatility and the reaction to this likely
volatility from investors, equity analysts, and ratings agencies have played key
roles. Additional concerns regarding the impact of earnings volatility on
compensation plans, as well as the general level of additional earnings
‘noise’ from actual pension performance, has caused management teams
to be wary of adopting this approach. Based on our analysis, however, we
believe these concerns are overstated, and that as a noncash accounting
change, none of these concerns are material enough to warrant preferring
one method over the other.
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To the extent that the adoption of MTM accounting has been made in
conjunction with the standard investment portfolio implementation, plan
sponsors will likely experience a level of expense volatility that can reduced
by alternative investment strategies. When measured in relation to the plan
expenses and liabilities, both an LDI strategy and a risk parity strategy
reduce surplus volatility versus traditional optimized 60/40 implementa-
tions. Plan sponsors evaluating a shift to MTM and sensitized to earnings
volatility may ﬁnd that an alternative asset implementation better aligns
both their accounting and ﬁnancial goals.
Endnotes
1. S&P Capital IQ, based on monthly data from 1995 to 2004, with the S&P 500
representing equities and the Barclays US Aggregate representing ﬁxed income.
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